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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
deferring to the Review Commission's decisions because of the Commis-
sion's experience with complex regulations and familiarity with the cir-
cumstances of each employer.5 While the Fourth Circuit's liberal interpre-
tation of OSHA provisions may present potential for agency abuse, the
court noted that the Review Commission proceeds with circumspection in
imposing its fines."
JOHN B. YELLOTr, JR.
XIV. TAX
A. Principle of Net Gift Affirmed
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner' the Supreme Court ruled
that the payment by an employer of an employee's income tax liability
results in additional taxable income to the employee. The Court further
held in Crane v. Commissioner' that a seller of property realizes income
from the disposal of mortgage liability to a purchaser, even though the
seller is not personally liable on the mortgage. In light of Old Colony Trust
and Crane, and in the absence of a statutory exclusion, the payment by a
donee of his donor's gift tax liability might well be considered income to
the donor under section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. This conclu-
sion would follow from the fact that the donee paid the tax liability of
another as in Old Colony Trust and relieved the transferor of a debt liabil-
ity as in Crane. There has been, however, considerable litigation over this
precise issue.3
Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, 504 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit
policy of allowing broad discretion for OSHA enforcement is also in accord with the view of
the Supreme Court and other circuits. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 453
(1977); Bowman Trans. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86
(1974); Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283, 1287 (6th Cir. 1976); Budd Co. v. OSHRC,
513 F.2d 201, 204 (3d Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1974).
" The Fourth Circuit noted that the fine for one of Hyman's repeated violations was only
$140.00, indicating that penalties are sensibly weighted to the gravity of the offense. 582 F.2d
at 842.
1 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
2 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
s The dispute between the IRS and taxpayers over the income tax consequences of the
payment of the gift tax by a donee first arose in Estate of Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A.
260 (1942), affl'd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943). In Estate of Staley
a donor had conveyed stock to a trust, reserving certain trust income to himself to pay the
gift tax. Both the Board of Tax Appeals, predecessor to the Tax Court, and the Fifth Circuit
held that this trust income was taxable to the donor as ordinary income. See 136 F.2d at 369-
70. The decision was based on the earlier established principle that the settlor was liable for
income taxes on any trust income over which he retained control. See Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940); I.R.C. §§ 671, 677. Later decisions dealing with gifts in trust have
determined that when any trust income is reserved to the donor or trustees to pay gift taxes,
that income is taxable to the donor as ordinary income. When the trustees must sell trust
corpora or borrow on the trust in order to pay the gift tax, however, no taxable gain is realized
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Donors, who are primarily liable for payment of gift taxes,4 have fre-
quently sought to require the donee to pay the gift tax as part of the
transaction.' The donor's gift tax liability is discharged if the donee pays
the gift tax.' The current controversy concerns whether payment of the gift
by the donor. See Commissioner v. Estate of Morgan, 37 T.C. 981 (1962), affl'd, 316 F.2d 238
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963); Estate of Scheaffer v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 99
(1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Estate of Craig R.
Sheaffer, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 646 (1966). In the foregoing cases the IRS had argued that the
payment of the gift tax out of trust income or corpora amounted to ordinary income to the
donor under § 677.
The courts' interpretation of § 677 allowed informed taxpayers to avoid paying income
taxes on a trustee's payment of the gift tax merely by not allowing trust income to be used
for such payment. Duhl & Cohen,.The Net Gift Technique: A Current Analysis of the Re-
quirements for Its Successful Use, 42 J. TAx. 158, 161 (1975). The IRS thus introduced the
alternative argument that the payment of gift taxes by a donee amounted to a taxable capital
gain to the donor where the amount of the gift tax paid exceeded the donor's adjusted basis
in the gift. Id. The IRS first advanced this argument in Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356
(1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), and has continued to argue similarly
in subsequent cases in this area. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.
1974), aff'g 59 T.C. 791 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); Henry v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 665 (1978); Owen v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 272 (1978); Estate of Davis v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972);
Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. June 27, 1972).
I.R.C. § 2502 (d). If the donor does not pay the gift taxes when due, the donee may be
held liable for the gift taxes to the extent of the value of the gift. I.R.C. § 6324 (b); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6324-1, T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544; see note 79 infra.
5 A donor may seek to require a donee to pay the gift tax because he lacks the liquid
assets with which to pay the tax himself. See Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 307 (1974);
Estate of Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260, 261 (1942). In such cases the donor may be
disposing of a tract of land or building solely because he lacks the liquid assets with which
to pay the property taxes or upkeep. See Schriebman, Structuring a Net Gift that Will Stand
Up: How to Satisfy IRS and the Courts, 39 J. TAx. 6, 6-7 (1973). In other cases the donor
may merely feel that the gift tax is more properly the obligation of the beneficiary of his
generosity, the donee. Id.
6 See generally Morse v. United States, 494 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1974) (acknowledging that
third party can pay income taxes for another). As of January 1, 1977 there is a single unified
rate schedule for both gift and estate taxes. See I.R.C. § 2001 (c). To compute the taxable
value of a gift, the gross value of the gift is reduced by the amount of any exclusions or
deductions. See I.R.C. § 2503. The rate schedule is then used to obtain the tentative tax, see
I.R.C. § 2001 (c), which is reduced by any credits to arrive at the actual gift tax due. See
I.R.C. § 2012.
When a donee pays the gift tax as a condition of the transfer, the Tax Court has decided
and the IRS has conceded that the gross value of the gift can be reduced by the ultimate gift
tax paid in determining the value of the gift tax for gift tax purposes. Pamela N. W. Lingo,
13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954); Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952); Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-
1 C.B. 310. For example, assume A gives B property worth $100,000 on condition that B pay
the gift tax. B is entitled to subtract from the $100,000 valuation the amount of the gift tax
he ultimately pays before computing his gift tax liability. An algebraic formula is necessary
for this computation since the value of the ultimate gift tax paid is needed to compute the
ultimate gift tax. See Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310.
If the donee was not obligated by the gift agreement to pay the gift tax, but nonetheless
paid it, he would not be entitled to reduce the value of the gift by the gift tax paid since he
received the full value of the gift without obligation to pay any gift taxes. See Sarah H.
Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350, 1357 (1952).
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tax by the donee when the gift tax exceeds the donor's basis in the gift
results in income tax liability to the donor.7 The Internal Revenue Service
has maintained that the donee is relieving the donor of a financial obliga-
tion by paying the gift tax owed by the donor, that such payment amounts
to consideration for the gift, and that the donor thus has received income
under section 61 (a)." According to this part-sale, part-gift analysis, the
donor realizes a taxable gain to the extent that the gift tax paid by the
donee exceeds the donor's basis in the gift.' Taxpayers have countered that
there should be no income attributed to the donee since the donor intended
a net gift, consisting of the gross value of the gift less the gift tax paid by
the donee. °
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Hirst v. Commissioner" and
held that payment of gift taxes by the donee as a condition to receipt of
the gift resulted in no taxable income to the donor, even though the gift
tax paid exceeded the donor's basis in the property. Hirst involved an 81
year old widow who gave her property to her son and his family in order
to avoid burdensome property taxes and to benefit her family. 2 The
widow, Edna Hirst, made the gifts subject to the condition that her son
and his wife pay the applicable gift taxes. Accordingly, the son and his wife
paid state and federal gift taxes amounting to $85,469.55.11 Although the
taxes exceeded Hirst's adjusted basis in the property by $77,092.55, Hirst
did not include any of the gift tax payments in her gross income on her
next income tax return." The IRS asserted a deficiency against Hirst,'5
7 See note 3 supra.
9 See Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971); Turner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968),
IRS nonacquiescence, 1971-2 C.B. 4.
See Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971).
" Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 363 (1968).
" 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
12 Id. at 435.
t1 Id. The appraised value of the property transferred by Hirst was $444,588.50. The
federal gift tax amounted to $68,277.00, while the Virginia gift tax paid was $17,192.55. Id.
at 436.
The federal gift tax was computed on the basis of the gross value of the gift less the
ultimate gift tax paid in accordance with Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310. Virginia refused
to allow such a procedure and required the gift tax to be computed on the gross value of the
gift, $444,588.50. 572 F.2d at 435-36.
" 572 F.2d at 435. The taxpayer's basis in property is normally its cost to the taxpayer
when acquired. I.R.C. § 1012. The basis is adjusted up for certain expenditures properly
allocable to the capital account and adjusted down to reflect certain deductions such as
depreciation. See I.R.C. § 1016. Upon the sale of the property, the consideration received less
the adjusted basis is the taxpayer's realized gain. See I.R.C. § 1001.
' 572 F.2d at 435-36. A notice of deficiency, also known as a ninety day letter, is formal
notice to a taxpayer that the IRS has determined that some amount is owed by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer is allowed ninety days to petition the Tax Court for redetermination of the
deficiency before the IRS will move to assess and collect the deficiency. I.R.C. § 6212. The
notice of deficiency normally follows an office or field audit and subsequent opportunities for
a district conference and an Appellate Division hearing with the IRS. PPENTIcE-HALL, FED-
ERAL TAX HANDBOOK 549-51 (1978).
The Commissioner's deficiency notice computed Hirst's tax deficiency as follows:
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claiming that she received additional taxable income, to the extent the gift
tax paid by the donee exceeded her adjusted basis in the property, in the
form of a long term capital gain from a sale of property as described in
section 61 (a) (3).16
On a petition for redetermination of the asserted deficiency, 7 the Tax
Court, concluded that Hirst realized no income in the gift transaction. 8 In
deciding the case, the Tax Court relied heavily upon Turner v.
Commissioner,"5 a previous decision of the Tax Court which had been
summarily affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. In Turner, the donor made sev-
eral gifts of securities on the condition that the donees pay the gift taxes."0
The IRS claimed that the transactions were part-sales, part-gifts because
the donees had paid gift taxes exceeding the donor's basis in the securi-
ties.2' The Tax Court in Turner rejected the part-sale, part-gift theory and
characterized the transaction as a net gift, determining that the donor
intended to convey a gift amounting to the gift's gross value less the gift
tax paid.2 2 Concluding that the facts in Hirst were indistinguishable from
Federal gift tax $68,277.00 .093
Virginia gift tax 17,192.55 094
Total gift tax paid 85,469.55 095
Less adjusted basis of 1/2 8,377.00 096
Interest in real estate
Realized gain 77,092.55 098
Recognized gain - 50% $38,546.28 099
572 F.2d at 436.
IS Only 40% of long term capital gains, which are defined in § 1222 of the Internal
Revenue Code, are taxable as of 1979. I.R.C. § 1202.
17 The taxpayer has ninety days after the mailing of a deficiency notice to petition the
Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiency. See note 15 supra. Alternatively, a taxpayer
may pay the deficiency and file a claim for refund with the IRS. Such payment and filing
entitles a taxpayer to sue for a refund in the Court of Claims or the federal district court.
See I.R.C. § 7422.
" Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974).
It 49 T.C. 356 (1968).
49 T.C. at 358.
21 Id. at 360. There were nine gifts of securities made in Turner, three outright to individ-
uals and six in trust for the benefit of certain persons. Id. at 358. The IRS conceded that the
six transfers in trust were not part-sales, id. at 362, attempting to distinguish the outright
transfers from the transfers in trust. The IRS felt this distinction was in its interest since it
had not raised the part-sale, part-gift argument in the previous gift in trust cases. See note 3
supra. The logic of the attempted distinction was based on the contrast between the con-
tracted personal liability of the donee. for gift taxes in the outright transfer and the absence
of such personal liability on the part of the donee-trustee. The IRS argued that in the outright
transfer the donor retained no interest in the transferred property but had accepted the mere
promise of the donee to pay the gift taxes. 49 T.C. at 362-63. Thus, no net gift could be
consummated since the net gift concept required that certain of the donated property be
delegated to gift tax payment. Id. The IRS implicitly acknowledged that the net gift concept
had some validity in the trust context since the trustee can only resort to the trust corpora,
or to income or borrowed funds arising therefrom, to pay the gift taxes. The Tax Court in
Turner rejected the IRS's distinction, preferring to focus on the intent of the donor rather
than the form of the transaction. Id. at 363.
11 Id. The Tax Court's decision in Turner was influenced by the effect an acceptance of
the part-sale argument would have upon the computation of the donee's basis. Id. at 363-64.
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
those in Turner, the Hirst Tax Court followed Turner3 and subsequent
decisions employing the Turner analysis.24
In following Turner, the Tax Court declined to apply Johnson v.
Commissioner,25 a more recent Sixth Circuit decision which purported to
limit Turner to its facts. 21 In Johnson a donor, using certain low basis
securities as collateral, borrowed $200,000 from a bank without personal
liability.Y The donor then gave the pledged securities, which had a fair
market value of over $500,000 to a trust for the benefit of his children. The
trustees subsequently substituted their note for that of the donor's, pledg-
ing the same collateral. The donor used $150,000 of the $200,000 loan
proceeds to satisfy the gift tax liability resulting from the gift of securities
to the trust.3 Concluding that this transaction was a part-sale, part-gift,
the Tax Court in Johnson held that the donor realized a taxable gain of
$200,000 less his basis in the securities. 2 The Johnson Tax Court consid-
ered the Johnson transaction distinguishable from that in Turner since the
Johnson transaction failed to fulfill all the requirements for a net gift, most
notably the requirement that the donor's retained interest be committed
to gift tax payment."0 While affirming the Johnson Tax Court's decision,
The donee is allowed to add to his basis in the donated property the sum of any amount he
paid for the property plus any gift tax paid on the transaction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4,
T.D. 6693, 1963-2 C.B. 326. If the gift were a part-sale, part-gift, the donee would get double
credit in his basis for the gift tax paid, once as an amount paid for the gift and once as the
payment of the gift tax. 49 T.C. at 364.
"' 63 T.C. at 314. The Tax Court has decided that it will follow a U.S. Court of Appeals
precedent which is directly applicable to a pending case where the only appeal from its
decision is to that circuit. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). Since the Hirst case was
appealable to the Fourth Circuit, not the Sixth, the Tax Court did not have to follow Turner
under its self-imposed rule. However, in the interest of uniformity, the Tax Court will often
follow decisions of other circuits when there is no appellate decision in the appropriate circuit
which is directly applicable. See Banker's Union Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 661,
674-75 (1974).
24 63 T.C. at 314. The Tax Court cited Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1363 (1971) and Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971) as cases supporting the
Turner analysis. In Davis, the Tax Court, following Turner, rejected the part-sale, part-gift
argument when a donor transferred securities to his son on the condition that the son pay
the gift taxes. 30 T.C.M. at 1368. The Krause Tax Court, citing Turner, rejected the part-
sale, part-gift argument when a donor made gifts to trusts for the benefit of his grandchildren
on the condition that the trustees pay the gift taxes. 56 T.C. at 1248.
495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974).
21 63 T.C. at 314.
2 495 F.2d at 1080. The donor's basis in the securities in Johnson was $10,812.50. Id.
2Id.
Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791, 813 (1973).
Id. at 812-13. The Tax Court in Johnson considered that case to be governed by Crane,
which had held that the discharge of a debt by a third party results in income to the relieved
debtor. Id. at 810. The court suggested four ways in which the Johnson transaction did not
meet the criteria for a net gift. First, the court noted that there was no condition in Johnson
that the donees pay the gift tax. Second, the Tax Court determined that there was no
retention of any interest by the donors in the securities transferred to the trustees. Third, the
court pointed out that the loan liability assumed by the trustees exceeded the gift tax liability
1979]
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the Sixth Circuit went further, declaring Turner a precedent limited to its
own facts." The Sixth Circuit considered the factual distinctions suggested
by the Tax Court between Johnson and Turner of little import. 2 The court
saw these distinctions, which consisted of differences between both the
methods and the results of the Johnson and Turner transactions,3 as only
minor variations in the form of the transactions. 4 Consequently, the Sixth
Circuit based its Johnson decision on three broader grounds, which it
presumably would apply to typical net gifts as well as to the unusual
Johnson transaction. The three grounds relied upon by the court were the
Crane rule, the Old Colony Trust rule, and the broad language of section
61(a).11
The Hirst Tax Court agreed with the Johnson Tax Court that Johnson
was distinguishable from Turner."' While recognizing the strength of the
IRS's contention that a portion of the gift should not pass to the donee
without being subject to either gift or income taxation, the Hirst Tax Court
considered the net gift concept too well established to abandon." The IRS
appealed the Hirst case to the Fourth Circuit. 8 A three judge panel re-
versed the Tax Court decision,39 finding the Turner decision incorrect and
citing with approval the Sixth Circuit's limitation of Turner to its facts. 0
According to the panel, the Old Colony Trust rule, that the discharge of
another's tax liability results in the receipt of income by the taxpayers so
discharged, prevailed over the net gift concept.4' The panel attached no
significance to the pretransfer agreement between the donor and donee as
to the payment of gift taxes.
2
(e.g., $200,000 loan liability, $150,000 gift tax liability). Finally, the Tax Court concluded that
the substance of the Johnson transaction was a part-sale, part-gift, not a net gift. Id. at 812-
13.
" 495 F.2d at 1085. In limiting Turner to its facts the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the
IRS's concessions in Turner were crucial to the Turner result. See note 21 supra. The Sixth
Circuit also considered the Tax Court's unwarranted concern about the possible double credit
to the donee's basis crucial to the result in Turner. 495 F.2d at 1085; see note 22 supra. The
Sixth Circuit considered the Tax Court's concern without justification, since Congress plainly
did not intend a donee to get double credit to his basis. 495 F.2d at 1085-86.
3 495 F.2d at 1082.
3 See note 30 supra.
3, 495 F.2d at 1082.
See id. at 1083.
11 See Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 314 (1974); note 30 supra.
:7 See 63 T.C. at 315. The Hirst Tax Court characterized the Sixth Circuit's limitation
of Turner to its facts in Johnson as error, id. at 314-15, and stated that the Sixth Circuit's
limitation of Turner was based on the mistaken conclusion that the IRS's concession in
Turner as to the gifts in trust was crucial to the outcome. Id.; see note 21 supra.
' The Courts of Appeals generally have the same jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Tax Court as they do decisions of federal district courts. See I.R.C. § 7482.
1, Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 428 (4th Cir. 1978). The original majority opinion
of the Fourth Circuit panel is the dissenting opinion from the subsequent en banc decision.
See 572 F.2d at 434.
,1 Id. at 437. The Fourth Circuit panel specifically disagreed with the Hirst Tax Court's
decision not to reconsider the correctness of the Turner decision. Id.




Upon rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit rejected the panel's conclu-
sion and upheld the decision of the Tax Court.43 The Fourth Circuit gave
considerable deference to the Tax Court's finding of fact that a net gift was
intended, rather than a part-sale, part-gift." The Fourth Circuit stated
that there was no economic gain to Hirst in the transaction, nor any intent
on her part to sell her property. The court also emphasized the noncom-
mercial, family context in which the transaction was consummated. 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Tax Court's finding was
not clearly erroneous."
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily upon Turner
while finding Johnson inapplicable to the facts.47 The court reasoned that
the crucial distinction between Turner-Hirst and Johnson was that in both
Turner and Hirst there was a commitment of part of the transferred prop-
erty to payment of the gift tax, whereas in Johnson the donor was unre-
stricted in his use of the retained funds. 8 Thus, the court concluded that
the Turner and Hirst donors realized no economic gain from their gifts, in
contrast to the Johnson donor who obtained $200,000 free from obligation. 9
Finally, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the general applicability of the
Crane principle, but rejected its applicability to Hirst because of the close
family relationship involved and the absence of any obligation between the
parties other than the gift tax payment agreement."
Although there is ample case and regulatory support for the conclusion
that a part-sale, part-gift results in income to the donor to the extent that
the compensation received exceeds the donor's basis,5" courts have consis-
, Id. at 431. The majority adopted the reasoning of Senior Judge Bryan's dissent from
the panel opinion in addition to Chief Judge Haynsworth's opinion for the en banc court. Id.
at 428.
U1 Id. at 430.
Id. at 431.
" Id. at 430.
Id. at 428-31. Since the Fourth Circuit was not obligated to rule on the basis of either
Turner or Johnson, it did not concern itself with whether the Sixth Circuit had abandoned
Turner in its Johnson decision. See note 23 supra.
" Id. at 430-31.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
" Id. at 431. The Fourth Circuit rejected the application of Crane to Hirst on the basis
of the close family relationship involved and the absence of any additional obligations be-
tween the parties. The Fourth Circuit suggested that Crane would also be inapplicable where
a son borrows money from a bank and his father gratuitously pays off the loan for his son.
Such a transaction would not result in taxable income to the son, but would be a gift. Id.
52 See Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam,
455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972) (donor of property subject to mortgage realized income to extent
mortgage disposed of exceeded his adjusted basis); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (e) (1957).
One commentator has suggested that allocation of the donor's basis should be required
where a transaction is found to be a part-sale, part-gift. See Note, Bad News for Net Givers:
Donee Payment of Gift Taxes Results in Taxable Income to Donor, 36 Prrr. L. Rav. 517, 534-
35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bad News]. Allocation would result in the seller-donor being
able to use only that proportion which is sold in computing his gain. For example, assume A
has property with a $30,000 basis and a fair market value of $60,000. A transfers the property
1979]
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tently refused to view the donee's payment of the gift tax as compensa-
tion.53 By rejecting the part-sale, part-gift argument in Hirst, the Fourth
Circuit has left the Johnson Tax Court as the only court which has applied
the part-sale, part-gift characterization to a gift tax arrangement with a
donee. 4 Despite the persuasiveness of the Hirst court's rejection of the
part-sale characterization, the Fourth Circuit's analysis does not explain
adequately why the acceptance of the net gift characterization of a transac-
tion should result in a finding of no taxable gain to the donor." Relying on
the Tax Court's findings, the Fourth Circuit simply declared that Hirst
received nothing for herself in this transaction."
An important aspect of the Fourth Circuit's opinion is the application
of Old Colony Trust and Crane to the Hirst transaction. 57 The Hirst court
accepted Turner and the net gift characterization of the Hirst transfer.,
The Fourth Circuit's implicit rejection of Old Colony Trust's applicability
to Hirst follows from such acceptance. "9 In Old Colony Trust, a company
paid the income taxes of certain of its officers." The Supreme Court held
that this discharge of the officers' obligation resulted in taxable income to
the officers. The Court viewed the payment as consideration for the offi-
cers' services and not a corporate gift. The Fourth Circuit acted properly
by refusing to invoke the Old Colony Trust rule in Hirst. The logic of the
to his son for $40,000. A has made a $40,000 sale and a $20,000 gift. See Treas. Reg. §
1001.1(e)(2). A's gain without allocation of his basis is $10,000, while with allocation it is
$40,000-(2/3 X $30,000) or $20,000. Such allocation is required by § 1011(b) for bargain sales
to charitable organizations, where a § 170 deduction for charitable contributions is allowed.
Since there is a public policy supporting charitable transfers, it has been argued that the
seller-donor of a part-sale, part-gift to a non-charity should be subject to the same allocation
requirements. See Bad News, supra at 534-35.
1 See Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 1978); Krause v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971); Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 356, 363 (1968).
" The Tax Court in Johnson labelled the transaction at issue a part-sale, part-gift.
Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791, 813 (1973). However, the Sixth Circuit in Johnson,
while affirming the Tax Court's decision, refused to label the transaction at issue a part-sale,
part-gift. Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1974). The Circuit Court
considered the term part-sale, part-gift a mere appellation without any significance. Id.
m See Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427, 430-31 (4th Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit
is not the only court which has declined to become involved in any rigorous analysis of why
a net gift should not result in taxation. The Tax Court in Turner essentially limited its inquiry
to whether there was a part-sale, part-gift or a net gift. See 49 T.C. at 362-63. The court
concluded that a net gift was made and held that the donor therefore incurred no income tax
liability. Id. The Turner Tax Court did not adequately explain why a net gift should not result
in income taxation. Subsequent Tax Court decisions have been even less helpful in explaining
why a net gift should not result in income the donor. See Estate of Davis v. Commissioner
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363, 1368 (1971); Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971)
(relying on Turner, both decisions found net gifts not taxable).
" 572 F.2d at 430.
57 See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
572 F.2d at 428.
' The Fourth Circuit majority opinion did not mention Old Colony Trust despite the
fact that the original panel majority relied upon it. See 572 F.2d at 438.




net gift characterization belies the contention that the donee pays the tax
liability of the donor out of his own funds. The net gift concept contem-
plates a retention of ownership by the donor in a portion of the transferred
assets which is equal in value to the resultant gift tax liability. 2 Under the
net gift theory, the subsequent payment of the gift tax is not a payment
by the donee with his own assets.63 The donee is, in a sense, the agent of
the donor, paying the gift taxes with that portion of the gift agreed by both
parties to be the donor's property." This situation is clearly distinguisha-
ble from that in Old Colony Trust where the corporation was paying the
taxes out of its own funds and in consideration for the officers' services. 5
Similarly, acceptance of the net gift characterization supports the
Fourth Circuit's express refusal to apply Crane to the Hirst transaction."
In Crane, the taxpayer inherited an apartment building subject to a large
mortgage and subsequently sold the building for a relatively small amount
of cash. The taxpayer claimed that she had realized a taxable capital gain
only to the extent the cash received exceeded her adjusted basis in the
property." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the taxpayer real-
ized a taxable capital gain to the extent the principal of the transferred
mortgage plus the cash received exceeded her adjusted basis." The Court
reasoned that the taxpayer realized a gain because a mortgagor of property
must treat the mortgage as his personal obligation as long as he owns that
property.7" Hirst is distinguishable from Crane since in Hirst the transferee
did not accept the primary liability of the transferor. Under the net gift
concept, Hirst merely discharged her own debt through her agent, the
donee.7 ' In the sale transaction in Crane, the mortgage liability passed to
the transferee with the property.72 In contrast, in the gift transaction in
Hirst, the primary gift tax liability remained with the donor after the
property transfer.
7
62 See Duhl & Cohen, The net gift technique: A current analysis of the requirements for
its successful use, 42 J. TAx. 158, 163 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Technique].
93Id.
64 Id.
0 Cases which have invoked the Old Colony Trust rule invariably involved a payor who
used his own funds to satisfy another's obligation. See United States v. Boston & M. R. R.,
279 U.S. 732 (1929) (lessee's payment of lessor's income tax liability pursuant to provision of
lease was taxable income to lessor); United States v. Britt, 335 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964)
(borrower's payment of brokerage fees to lender who held funds to satisfy broker's obligation
to lender was taxable income to broker); Wallin Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1934) (facts and result similar to Boston & M.); Levey v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 401 (D.C.
Cir. 1933) (corporation's reimbursement to certain officers for their income tax payments were
taxable income to officers).
66 See note 51 supra.




1' See Technique, supra note 62, at 163.
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
7' See note 4 supra. Of course, a gift of property subject to indebtedness will be subject
to the Crane principle if the primary liability passes to the donee. See Malone v. United
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Despite the non-applicability of Old Colony Trust and Crane, the net
gift technique arguably should not free Hirst from income tax liability on
the gift tax payments. A strong argument can be made, even under the net
gift characterization, for the proposition that Hirst did receive something
of value and that the gift tax payment was therefore properly taxable as
income to Hirst. Section 1001(a), which describes the computation of gain,
includes in its purview not only sales and exchanges, but also "other dispo-
sitions of property."74 Several cases have held that certain transfers of
property which did not amount to a sale or exchange were nonetheless
taxable events because they amounted to "dispositions of property. '75 In
all these cases, the court concluded that the transferor had received some
taxable economic benefit from the transfer. Arguably Hirst is analagous to
these cases, since Hirst used a portion of her property to discharge her gift
tax liability.76 Under the net gift concept, Hirst obtained discharge from a
gift tax liability of $85,469.55 by transferring through her donee to the
government property with a fair market value equal to that amount, but
with a basis which was considerably less.77 Gain from such a disposition of
property can be computed under section 1001(a) and in this case the gain
would be equal to Hirst's gift tax liability less her basis in the property.78
States, 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972)
(donor of property subject to mortgage realized income to extent mortgage disposed of ex-
ceeded his basis); Bacas, Gifts of Property Subject to Indebtedness: Johnson v. Commis-
sioner, 44 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 86, 97-98 (1975). The Sixth Circuit held Crane was applicable
to Johnson. Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1974). This holding was
proper since the net gift characterization could not be applied to the Johnson transaction.
See note 30 supra. The funds retained by the donors were uncommitted to gift tax payment
and therefore the donor could properly be said to have gained something of value from the
donees, a third party. Although the Sixth Circuit stated that the Turner net gift transaction
resulted in income to the donor, it did not expressly rely on Crane in so concluding. Id.
1, I.R.C. § 1001(a). The gain from a sale or other disposition of property is the excess of
the amount realized in the transaction over the adjusted basis of the taxpayer in the property.
Id.
7' See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (transfer of appreciated stock by
husband to his wife as part of property settlement was taxable disposition); United States v.
General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960) (employer was liable for capital gains taxes in
amount his tax deductions for contributions of property to employee's trust exceeded his basis
in property); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943)
(corporation realized a taxable capital gain to the extent the cost to it of securities donated
by it to employees was less than their fair market value); 18 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 69, 72-73
(1961).
" See Technique, supra note 62, at 163.
" See 572 F.2d at 431.
"' See I.R.C. § 1001(a). The characterization of a Hirst-type transaction as a net gift or
a part-sale, part-gift may affect whether the gain is afforded capital gains treatment if the
net gift is considered a disposition of property under § 1001(a). The gain realized in the part-
sale, part-gift is entitled to capital gains treatment since it results from a sale or exchange of
a capital asset. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(c), 1222. The gain realized in a net gift can be treated as
ordinary income since it results from a disposition of property not amounting to a sale or
exchange. See I.R.C. § 1001(c); J. R. Hopkins, 15 T.C. 160 (1950) (payments received by




Thus, although the net gift characterization may serve to distinguish
Crane and Old Colony Trust, such characterization should not necessarily
result in a finding of no taxable gain to the donor."
The Tax Court in Hirst recognized that if Hirst's gain was not taxed
at the time of the gift it would escape taxation altogether, since the donee's
basis will be equal to the donor's pre-gift basis plus the amount of gift tax
paid."° The Tax Court did not act on this problem only because it consid-
ered the Turner rule too well established to abandon. 1 This response ag-
gravates the damage to tax revenues in a Hirst-type transaction, since the
taxes which arguably are due on the donor's gain are not merely deferred,
but are excused altogether.
Despite this problem, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hirst produces a
beneficial social result. The decision allows a cash poor person, such as
Hirst, to keep her property within the family rather than being forced to
sell a portion of it outside the family simply to raise money for gift or
property taxes. Of course, the donee could give the donor cash to pay the
gift tax, but this transaction itself could generate gift tax liability. Con-
gress could partially solve the net gift problem by amending section 1015
of the Internal Revenue Code to disallow the addition of the gift tax paid
to the donee's basis in the transferred property in the case of net gifts. Such
an amendment would delay the taxation of donor's appreciation until the
donee sold or disposed of the property, rather than allowing the apprecia-
tion to avoid taxation altogether as in Hirst. While such an amendment
would not eliminate the potential application of section 1001(a) to the net
gift, courts would be unlikely to so apply section 1001(a) after such an
expression of legislative support for the net gift. The social benefits of the
net gift policy could thus be retained without loss to the government of
revenues from the taxable appreciation of property.2
1, A related question is whether the collection of gift taxes from the donee by the IRS
pursuant to the IRS's lien on the gift property should result in income to the donor. Presuma-
bly it should since Old Colony Trust would apply. The donee could be said to have relieved
the tax liability of the donor with the donee's own funds. See note 4 supra. Several cases,
however, have treated the donee's obligation for gift taxes as independent of the donor's, with
the IRS having the option to collect from the donee without seeking to collect from the donor.
See Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1945); Estate of
M.J. Burrell, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 489 (1944); E. K. Vogel, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 306 (1944). This
principle could be extended to viewing collection of the gift tax from the donee as dispositive
of his own debt and not that of donor's. Such a view would refute the application of Old
Colony Trust. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
" See Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 315 (1974); I.R.C. § 1015. Section 1015(d)(6)
reduces somewhat the increase in the donee's basis for gift tax paid on gifts made after
December 31, 1976. This change does not alter the principle that the appreciation used to
pay gift tax in a Hirst-type transaction may be improperly escaping all taxation.
See Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 315 (1974).
The Tax Court has reaffirmed its commitment to the net gift doctrine in two cases
analagous to Hirst. See Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978); Owen v. Commissioner,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 272 (1978). Both the cases involved gifts in trust given on condition that
the trustees pay the gift taxes. These cases are now on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which
may have to decide whether it will reject the net gift concept as it indicated it would in
Johnson. [1979] 9 FED. TAxEs (P-H) 61,000 at 61,035; [1978 Federal Taxes Citator] FEn.
TAXEs (P-H) at 13,106; see Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1974).
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B. Deductibility of Expenses Incurred by Existing Businesses
Expanding into New Activities
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows for the deduction
of all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or
business.' Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations, however, define
"carrying on a trade or business,"' 2 thus creating uncertainty for existing
businesses expanding into peripheral areas of operation. If a new enter-
prise3 is adjudged to be part of an existing business, section 162(a) deduc-
tions for the expenses of the new enterprise are proper.4 When the com-
pany's new enterprise is found to be a separate and distinct business,
however, the company may not deduct the new enterprise's expenses until
that enterprise functions as a going concern.5 The denial of a section 162(a)
I See I.R.C. § 162(a). The question of whether an expense is ordinary and necessary is
normally one of fact. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). Ordinary and
necessary expenses are not defined in the Code or the Treasury Regulations. Cases dealing
with whether an expense is ordinary and necessary generally turn on the reasonableness of
the expense under the circumstances. Compare Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467
(1943) (attorney's fee ordinary and necessary expense to business faced with receiving poten-
tially destructive fraud order from government agency) with Trebilcock v. Commissioner, 557
F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1977) (amounts paid by sole proprietor of wood brokerage business to
minister for spiritual advice not deductible as ordinary and necessary expense).
2 See [1978] 1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1332.107.
3 The terms "new enterprise" and "peripheral area of operation" are used to describe
those new activities of an existing business which are so different in character or separate from
the previous activities of the business that a question is raised as to whether a new business
has been created for § 162(a) deduction purposes. Compare Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16
T.C.M. (CCH) 1081 (1957) (lecturer allowed to deduct expenses incurred in unsuccessful
attempt to obtain employment as television narrator since latter occupation found not to be
new and separate from lecturer profession) with Estate of Brawner, 36 B.T.A. 884 (1937)
(manager of rental properties denied deduction for expenses incurred in preparations for
buying apartment house, since buying and selling of apartment houses is separate business
from managing rental property).
I See York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958) (commercial developer allowed
to deduct expenses in industrial development).
I See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.),
remanded on another issue, 382 U.S. 68 (1965) (denied § 162(a) deduction to television station
for expenses incurred in training its staff prior to obtaining broadcasting license from FCC);
Vincent W. Eckel, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 147 (1974) (businessman involved in gun sales business
denied business deduction for expenses incurred in trip to Africa for purpose of obtaining
information to be used in business of training big game hunters); Estate of Browner, 36 B.T.A.
884 (1937) (manager of rental properties denied deduction for expenses incurred in prepara-
tions for buying apartment house, since buying and selling of apartment houses is separate
business from managing rental property). The expenses of a new enterprise which is deter-
mined to be an immature new business for § 162(a) purposes may, however, be added to the
basis of the company as a capital expenditure. See Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Alternatively, if the company is seeking a net
operating loss deduction under § 172, it may use these new enterprise expenses in computing
a net operating loss, but only to the extent of the company's income from the new enterprise.
See I.R.C. § 172(d)(4).
The justification for not allowing § 162(a) deductions for startup expenses is the probabil-
ity that a contrary rule would result in the granting of business deductions to expenses which
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deduction may be a considerable burden to a business which has under-
taken an expensive new operation which has produced little income., Fac-
ing such a situation in Malmstedt v. Commissioner,7 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a residential real estate development firm had not entered
a new business when it became involved in commercial real estate develop-
ment. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the company's commercial
development expenses were deductible from its total residential-
commercial gross income under section 162(a).
The Malmstedt case was the unexpected conclusion to an ambitious
real estate development scheme. Bertil Malmstedt and Margaret Johnson
formed a real estate development partnership in 1958.8 Initially the part-
nership engaged in two residential real estate development projects. In
1959, however, the partnership purchased property adjacent to one of its
residential projects for the purpose of commercial development., The part-
nership subsequently spent a substantial sum of money in an unsuccessful
attempt to develop this commercial property.'0 Concurrent with the devel-
opment of this property, which was called Gold Mine, the partnership
became involved in a third residential development. These two projects
overextended the resources of the partnership and forced it to refinance its
indebtedness on the Gold Mine property. The partnership was required to
pay a high refinancing fee in order to obtain the new loan. Subsequently
the partnership failed to meet the interest payment on this debt and its
creditors foreclosed on both Gold Mine and the third residential develop-
ment. The Gold Mine property was sold in 1964 at a judicial sale."
The IRS asserted deficiencies against Malmstedt on his 1963 income
tax return and against Johnson on her 1964 return. Malmstedt and John-
son, who married in 1965, subsequently filed a petition for redetermination
with the Tax Court." The controversy concerned the amount of taxable
gain realized by the Malmstedts in the forced sale of the Gold Mine prop-
erty. The Malmstedts contended, among other things,'3 that the interest
are actually personal. See Buell, Business Start Up Costs: Analyzing and Planning for Cur-
rent Deductibility, 43 J. TAX. 278, 280 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Start Up Costs].
Capitalizing a large expenditure made in a new venture does not produce the immedi-
ate tax advantages of a deduction. Thus, an expanding company will prefer to deduct such
expenses. See generally Start Up Costs, supra note 5, at 278.
7 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1978).
9 Id. at 521.
1 Id. at 522. The partnership planned to construct a luxury hotel on the purchased
property. Id.
'a Id. The partnership claimed to have spent over $500,000 in their unsuccessful attempt
to develop the Gold Mine property. Id.
" Id. at 523. In 1963 Bertil Malmstedt had assigned his interest in Gold Mine to Mar-
garet Johnson. Id.
12 Id. Once a deficiency has been asserted against a taxpayer by the IRS, he may file a
petition for redetermination with the Tax Court and have the deficiency reconsidered by the
Tax Court. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
11 There were numerous questions pertaining to the tax consequences of the Malmstedts'
business activities which were addressed by the Tax Court which are not relevant to the issues
addressed by the Fourth Circuit. See generally Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 199 (1976).
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payments, property taxes, and refinancing fee on the Gold Mine property
were deductible business expenses of the partnership, which could be in-
cluded in computing a net operating loss deduction." The IRS disagreed,
arguing that the expenses failed to qualify as business deductions.'
The Tax Court, while rejecting the IRS's further contention that the
expenses should be capitalized, 8 agreed with the IRS that the expenses
were not deductible under section 162(a) since the commercial develop-
ment was an immature new business rather than a part of the taxpayer's
previous residential development enterprise.' 7 Thus the expenses were de-
ductible only under section 172(d)(4), which allows the deduction of non-
business expenses in computing a net operating loss only to the extent of
non-business income. Losses from Gold Mine consequently were deducti-
ble only to the extent of any Gold Mine income, which was non-existent
in most of the years in question. The Tax Court recognized that in York
v. Commissioner" the Fourth Circuit found commercial development and
industrial development to be but one business."0 Nevertheless, -the Tax
Court distinguished the Malmstedt's situation on the basis of the qualita-
tive differences between modest residential development- and large-scale
" Id. at 207-09. If the taxpayers could have convinced the Tax Court that their Gold
Mine activities were simply a part of their general real estate development business, they
could have deducted their heavy losses from Gold Mine against their total residential-
coommercial income by means of the net operating loss deduction. See I.R.C. § 172(a). If the
Tax Court had agreed with the taxpayers on this point, their deficiency would have been
eliminated or substantially reduced. 578 F.2d at 524.
If the Gold Mine venture, however, was an attempt at a new business, no deduction
would be allowed under § 162(a) for its expenses. A deduction which is not attributable to a
trade or business can only enter into the computation of a net operating loss to the extent
permitted by § 172(d)(4). Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 199, 209 (1976).
That section allows non-business expenses to contribute to the computation of a net operating
loss, but only to the extent of the taxpayer's non-business income, which here would include
any Gold Mine income, but not the residential development income. Since the taxpayers
realized no income from the Gold Mine venture in those years in which the greatest portion
of its claimed deductible expenses were incurred, the § 172(d)(4) deduction was of negligible
value to the taxpayers. See generally 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 202-04.
35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 209.
l' Id. at 208-09. The Tax Court in Malmstedt agreed with the IRS that certain other
expenses of Gold Mine, such as insurance and legal and architectural fees, should be capital-
ized. Id. at 208. This holding was not contested on appeal.
11 Id. at 209-10.
" See note 14 supra.
" 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958). In York a developer experienced in apartment and shop-
ping center development deducted an expenditure for an expert survey on the feasibility of
certain land for industrial development. The Fourth Circuit found this industrial expense to
be properly deductible, since the industrial development business was within the compass of
York's previous development activities. Id. at 422.
20 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 209 n.22. The Tax Court has decided that it will follow a U.S.
Court of Appeals' decision which is directly applicable where the only appeal from its decision
is to that circuit. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1242, aff'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). Since York was a Fourth Circuit decision
and Malmstedt was appealable only to the Fourth Circuit, the Tax Court either had to follow
York or distinguish it.
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commercial development." The contrast in size between the Malmstedt's
previous residential development and the Gold Mine scheme was the sole
qualitative difference cited by the court."
Both the IRS and Mrs. Malmstedt appealed the Tax Court's decision
to the Fourth Circuit.Y The Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the Tax
Court, finding clearly erroneous the lower court's ruling that commercial
development is a separate business from residential real estate develop-
ment.24 According to the Malmstedt court, the York decision controlled,
since in both cases the business movement into commercial or industrial
development was reasonable, natural, and in the normal scope of a real
estate development business.25 The Fourth Circuit criticized the Tax
Court's use of supposed qualitative differences between residential and
commercial development in distinguishing York, stating that the varying
sizes of two activities are not determinative of whether the activities are
one business or two.
2 6
In determining that Malmstedt was not engaging in a new business at
Gold Mine, the Fourth Circuit closely examined the conduct of the part-
nership since its formation. The Malmstedt court found that the partner-
ship had intended general real estate development from its inception and
not merely residential real estate activity.Y Important to the court's deter-
mination was the location of Gold Mine across the street from the partner-
ship's prior residential development and the initiation of the Gold Mine
project only a year after the formation of the partnership.28 Accordingly,
2, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 209 n. 22.
22 See id. at 209.
21 578 F.2d at 523. Bertil Malmstedt initially filed an appeal but withdrew his appeal
before the Fourth Circuit heard the case. Telephone conversation with Sylman I. Euzent,
Attorney for Malmstedts. (Oct. 20, 1978).
The IRS challenged the Tax Court's calculation of the taxpayers' basis in a corporation
they controlled. The Fourth Circuit remanded this issue, instructing the Tax Court to explain
how it calculated the taxpayers' basis in the subject stock. 578 F.2d at 528. The IRS did not
renew its argument that the Gold Mine expenses ought to be capitalized.
24 578 F.2d at 527. The Courts of Appeals are required to employ the same standard of
review for findings of fact made by the Tax Court as utilized in ruling on federal district court
findings of fact in cases tried without a jury. I.R.C. § 7482(a). Findings of fact made by the
Tax Court are not reversible by the Courts of Appeals unless clearly erroneous. See Road
Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (4th Cir. 1969); FED. R. Civ. P. 52
(a).
25 578 F.2d at 527.
2 Id. The Fourth Circuit found the Malmstedt case analagous to Cornelius Vanderbilt,
Jr., 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081 (1957) in which a lecturer was allowed to deduct expenses in an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain employment as a television narrator since the latter occupa-
tion was directly related to being a lecturer. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Frank B.
Polachek, 22 T.C. 858 (1954), and Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953), in which the Tax Court
denied claimed business deductions, on the ground that those two cases involved taxpayers
who were not engaged in any business at all, but were only seeking to establish one. 578 F.2d
at 526.
2 578 F.2d at 526.
nId. The Fourth Circuit also noted that the Gold Mine property was purchased from
the same owner as the earlier residential development property. Id.
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the court held that the interest, tax, and refinancing fee payments were
properly deductible under section 162(a). 9
The Malmstedt decision is a sound application of stare decisis, since it
strongly reaffirms the York principle. Indeed, the facts of Malmstedt lead
more easily than the facts of York to the conclusion that the new enterprise
was a part of the old business. The Malmstedts' venture into commercial
development was with property located directly across the street from its
previous development and was begun only a year after the formation of the
partnership."0 In contrast, York's industrial site was not geographically
adjacent to his previous commercial development, and he had spent seven
years in commercial development before beginning his industrial develop-
ment.3 1
Other jurisdictions have faced situations similar to Malmstedt. As in
Malmstedt, these jurisdictions have made a finding of fact as to whether
a new enterprise is part of the existing business.2 In making this determi-
nation these courts have looked at the circumstances of the business ex-
pansion in a realistic and nontechnical manner, with due regard for the
pressures upon businesses to innovate and diversify." Certain characteris-
tics, however, have been particularly prominent in the courts' analysis.
One such characteristic is the geographic proximity of the new activity to
the existing business," a factor which influenced the Fourth Circuit in
" Id. at 527-28. The Fourth Circuit also held that the Tax Court was correct in holding
that the refinancing fee could not be deducted in the year paid but must be amortized over
the life of the loan. Id. at 527-28. Upon foreclosure, however, the unamortized portion could
be deducted in its entirety in the year of foreclosure. See Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
781, 795 (1972); Metropolitan Prop. Corp., 24 B.T.A. 220, 225 (1931).
578 F.2d at 522.
' York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421, 422 (4th Cir. 1958).
' See Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1974)
(bank's new credit card operations were part of existing business); Schulumberger Tech.
Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 1971) (loan made by physical phenomena
measuring firm to corporation engaged in computer business was within scope of existing
business, since loan was in furtherance of firm's business interests in obtaining computer
analysis of its scientific data); Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705, 707
(D.C. Md. 1971) (parent corporation's expenses incurred in opening of subsidiary's plant were
within scope of parent's existing business); O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781, 786
(1974) (accountant involved in rental property in Nevada was commencing separate business
when he incurred expenses on trip to Florida for purpose of investigating purchase of rental
property); Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1, 12 (1965) (lock company did not enter new
business when it engaged in research and development in air compressors).
3 See Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1974)
(Tenth Circuit considered bank's expansion into credit card industry logical extension of
bank's business of providing consumer credit); Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333
F. Supp. 705, 711 (D.C. Md. 1971) (court recognized that subsidiary may be treated as part
of parent for tax purposes when its activities are substantially directed to benefit of its
parent).
11 See O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781, 786 (1974) (denied deduction to Nevada
rental property business for expenses incurred in investigating Florida property). But see
Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705, 707 (D.C. Md. 1971) (allowed
deduction to Maryland parent corporation for costs of operating California subsidiary's plant,
since parent's existing business was well served by California expansion).
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Malmstedt.5 A second usual factor, also relied upon by the Malmstedt
court,3" is whether the new enterprise is in some way functionally related
to the activities of the existing business, so as to supplement or assist
them." Thus, the Fourth Circuit's approach is York and Malmstedt is
consistent with that taken by the few jurisdictions which have faced this
issue.
The Tax Court has made a brief statement of its position on the busi-
ness expansion issue. The court has asserted that there is an imprecise
line between what is an integrated enterprise and what are two separate
businesses.39 That line, reasons the Tax Court, must be drawn on a case
by case basis, with consideration given to both geographic and functional
factors." The Fourth Circuit in Malmstedt and York, while overruling the
Tax Court's findings of fact in those cases, has employed analysis consis-
tent with the Tax Court's position. As the reversals in Malmstedt and York
indicate, however, the Fourth Circuit is more reluctant than the Tax Court
to draw a line between two activities and label them separate businesses.4'
The Fourth Circuit has preferred to give businesses greater latitude in
which to operate when new activities are commenced in a good faith effort
to make a profit."2
The Fourth Circuit's decisions on the issue of whether a new activity
is part of an existing business do not establish a definite standard and
therefore do not provide the business planner with certainty as to the tax
consequences of every expansion. As the results in cases such as Malmstedt
and York show, however, businesses acting in good faith to make a profit
have been very successful in obtaining deductions for expenses incurred in
new enterprises related in some manner to the existing business. The
nature of the existing business w'll in large measure determine the relative
importance a court will place on the geographic and functional factors.
When dealing with a business already operating in many geographic areas,
a court will be little concerned with the location of the new enterprise and
will concentrate on whether the new enterprise is functionally related to
the existing business.4 On the other hand, a business operating in a limited
geographic area, such as those in Malmstedt and York, may be presumed
to be opening a new business when it commences operations in a distant
3 578 F.2d at 526.
3' Id. at 527.
3 See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (promotional
expenses incurred in expansion of retail candy selling operation into franchising of candy
stores deductible under § 162(a)); note 33 supra.
See O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781, 786 (1974); note 30 supra.
62 T.C. at 786.
40 Id.
11 See 578 F.2d at 527; York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421, 422 (4th Cir. 1958).
42 See 578 F.2d at 527.
13 See, e.g., Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1 (1965) (lock company allowed to deduct
expenses of developing isothermal air compressor); notes 32 and 37 supra.
41 See Schulumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971) (see
note 32 supra).
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state. 5 Similarly, a conglomerate which manufactures a wide assortment
of goods should have little difficulty in demonstrating that a new product
is functionally within the scope of its existing business; while a specialized
firm will have more difficulty in showing that a new enterprise is part of
its existing specialized concern." Thus, although the Malmstedt decision
does not provide universally applicable standards for the new activity
issue, it does, when combined with other case law employing similar analy-
sis, illustrate useful factors for business tax planning.
C. Timeliness Requirements for Filing a Petition for
Redetermination of a Deficiency
The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
to send deficiency notices to taxpayers deemed deficient in payment of
income, gift, estate, or certain other federal taxes.' The taxpayer who
receives such a notice and wishes to challenge the deficiency determination
has several methods available to him. 2 One such method is provided by
section 6213(a), which grants taxpayers the right to a redetermination of
a deficiency in the Tax Court if a petition for redetermination is filed
within ninety days of the mailing of the deficiency notice.' Prior to 1954
the courts generally considered a petition for redetermination timely filed
only if it was received by the Tax Court within the ninety-day period.'
See O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781, 786 (1974).
< See Estate of Brawner, 36 B.T.A. 884 (1937) (manager of rental properties denied
deduction for expenses incurred in preparations for buying apartment house, since buying
and selling of apartment houses is separate business from managing rental property).
I I.R.C. § 6212(a).
2 A taxpayer may challenge the Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency by paying the
deficiency, making a claim for refund with the IRS, and suing for refund in the Court of
Claims or the federal district court. I.R.C. § 7422. Alternatively, a taxpayer may petition the
Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiency. I.R.C. § 6213(a). Finally, a taxpayer may,
in extenuating circumstances, obtain an IRS Appellate Division hearing if he has not had one,
or a rehearing if he has. INTERNAL REVEN E MANUAL 8320 (1977). This final alternative will
not toll the statutory period for filing a petition for redetermination in the Tax Court. Id.
3 I.R.C. § 6213(a) allows taxpayers 150 days for the filing of a petition for redetermination
if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States. A Saturday, Sunday, or
holiday in the District of Columbia is not counted as the last day of the 90 or 150 day period.
I.R.C. § 6213(a). During this period the IRS is not allowed, with some exceptions, to assess a
deficiency or move to collect the amount owed. Id. Likewise, once a petition for redetermina-
tion has been filed with the Tax Court, the IRS may not assess a deficiency or move to collect
until the Tax Court's decision has been finalized. Id.
I See, e.g., Di Prospero v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1949) (delay in mail
service does not excuse late filing); Stebbins Estate v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 892 (D.C. Cir.
1941) (failure of air mail service due to bad weather does not excuse late filing); Edward
Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1937) (court without power to
disregard strict language of statute despite equitable considerations in favor of taxpayer).
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Thus taxpayers needed to anticipate sufficiently the statutory deadline in
order to allow for the vagaries of postal service. However, with the enact-
ment of section 7502 in 1954, Congress adopted the postmark date on the
cover of a petition as the date of filing.' Since the enactment of section 7502
there has been considerable litigation concerning whether a timely post-
mark date is absolutely essential to obtaining the jurisdiction of the Tax
Court.' In Curry v. Commissioner the Fourth Circuit decided that a pris-
oner's petition for redetermination bearing a late postmark should be con-
sidered on the merits where the petition was postmarked late solely due
to errors of prison employees.
The facts in Curry were not complex. On April 14, 1975, the Internal
Revenue Service mailed a notice of deficiency to Willie A. Curry, a prisoner
at Leavenworth Penitentiary. Curry placed a petition for redetermination
in a prison mailbox on July 8, 1975, prior to the expiration of the statutory
period for filing under section 6213(a). A staff member of the prison, mis-
takenly believing the petition to be incorrectly addressed, returned it to
Curry on July 18 before the petition reached the U.S. mails.' The petition
finally received a postmark on July 24, seven days past the statutory dead-
line for mailing a petition for redetermination. All prison employees in-
A few courts chose to mitigate the harshness of § 6213(a) by establishing the rebuttable
presumption that a petition for redetermination properly addressed and deposited in the U.S.
mail was received in the ordinary course of the mail. See Detroit Automotive Prod. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 203 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1953). If a taxpayer could show that he mailed his
petition early enough to reach the Tax Court in a timely manner, the court presumed that
the delay was due to an internal failure in the Tax Court machinery, and granted jurisdiction
unless there was evidence that the delay was actually due to Post Office inefficiency. See
Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1952) (Johnson, J.,
concurring in part). One court in a pre-1954 decision employed equitable principles in holding
that the negligence of the Post Office could not operate to deprive a faultless taxpayer of his
day in the Tax Court. See Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 189 (8th
Cir. 1952).
1 I.R.C. § 7502(a)(1) provides that the date of the United States postmark stamped on
the cover of a claim or other document required to be filed before a prescribed date shall be
deemed the date of delivery. Section 7502(a)(2) expressly limits the application of §
7502(a)(1) to documents bearing a postmark dated no later than the prescribed date for filing.
Section 7502(c) provides that for registered mail the date of registration shall be deemed
the postmark date. Treasury Regulation § 301.7502-1(c)(2) provides that for certified mail
the date postmarked on the sender's receipt is the date of postmark. Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-
1(c)(2), T.D. 6444, 1960-1 C.B. 673.
1 See, e.g., Ruegsegger v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 463 (1977) (Tax Court accepted jurisdic-
tion of petition without postmark where petitioner adequately demonstrated that he mailed
petition early enough to receive timely postmark); Mason v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 354
(1977) (Tax Court accepted jurisdiction of petition with illegible postmark where petitioner
adequately demonstrated that he mailed petition early enough to receive timely postmark);
Perry Segura & Assoc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 406 (1975) (Tax Court accepted
jurisdiction where original cover for petition destroyed in postal handling and petition re-
wrapped in cover with late postmark).
7 571 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1307. The prisoners' mailbox at Leavenworth Penitentiary was not a U.S. mail-
box and therefore prison employees transferred the mail placed in it to the U.S. mails. Id.
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volved stated that Curry had done all he could to get the petition mailed
on time
Nonetheless, the Tax Court determined that Curry's petition for rede-
termination had not been timely filed and dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction." In an unpublished opinion, the Tax Court expressed sym-
pathy for Curry, but felt bound to dismiss his case" because of the fac-
tually indistinguishable circuit court precedents of Bloch v.
Commissioner"2 and Rich v. Commissioner. 3 In both of these cases the
courts concluded that they were without power to entertain the taxpayers'
petitions for redetermination since the ninety-day period of section 6213
was not merely a limitation, but a rigid line of demarcation upon the
jurisdiction of the Tax Court. 4 Both courts treated section 7502 as the
exclusive remedy for the earlier harsh operation of section 6213(a).15 Since
the prisoners had failed to file a petition for redetermination with a timely
postmark, the courts concluded that they lacked jurisdiction."
On appeal in Curry, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and
remanded the case for a decision on the merits. 17 Initially the Fourth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the equitable principles of Arkansas Motor Coaches,
Ltd. v. Commissioner"5 survived the passage of section 7502 and that these
'Id.
10 Id.
1 Id. The Tax Court has decided that it will follow a Court of Appeals precedent which
is-directly applicable where the only appeal from its decision is to that circuit. Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1242, 1256-56 (1970), aff'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). Since the Cuny case was appealable to the Fourth Circuit,
not the Fifth or the Ninth, the Tax Court was not obligated to follow Rich or Bloch. For the
sake of uniformity, however, the Tax Court will often follow decisions of other circuits where
there is no appellate decision on point in the applicable circuit. See Bankers Union Life Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 661, 674-75 (1974).
12 254 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1958). In Bloch, a prisoner placed a petition for redetermination
in the hands of a prison employee for mailing on two separate occasions. Prison regulations
required prisoners to give their mail to prison employees, who were then to mail the items.
Both petitions were given to the proper employee within the 90 day period, but neither was
mailed until after the statutory period for filing had passed. Id. at 277-78.
13 250 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1957). In Rich, a prisoner gave a petition for redetermination to
the prison official in charge of the mail room within the 90 day period for filing, with instruc-
tions to send it by registered mail. For unexplained reasons, the petition then lay in the prison
mail room for a month before it was finally mailed, one day beyond the statutory period for
filing. Id. at 172.
" See 254 F.2d at 279; 250 F.2d at 174.
IS See 254 F.2d at 279; 250 F.2d at 174. Prior to the enactment of § 7502, courts generally
considered a petition for redetermination timely filed only if it was received by the Tax Court
within the 90 day period of § 6213(a). See note 4 supra.
11 254 F.2d at 279; 250 F.2d at 175.
17 571 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1978). The IRS had decided not to seek certiorari in Curry at
the Supreme Court. [1979] 8 ST N. FED. TAx. REP. 5322.5216.
Is 198 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1952). In Arkansas Motor Coaches the taxpayer mailed his
petition six days prior to the close of the § 6213(a) filing period. Normal mail service would
have brought the petition to the Tax Court in one day. Id. at 190. The Tax Court's records,
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principles allowed the Tax Court to assume jurisdiction of Curry's case."
In Arkansas Motor Coaches, the Eighth Circuit directed the Tax Court to
accept jurisdiction of a petition for redetermination which was filed late,
when there was evidence that it was mailed sufficiently in advance to reach
the Tax Court on time. 0 The Eighth Circuit doncluded that it would be
inequitable to allow the government to use the negligence of- its own em-
ployees, whether they be postal workers or Tax Court employees, to defeat
a taxpayer in his effort to obtain the jurisdiction of the Tax Court.2' The
Fourth Circuit found Curry analogous to Arkansas Motor Coaches and
rejected the Commissioner's contention that passage of section 7502 su-
perseded the principle of that case.Y The court reasoned that section 7502
was limited in scope to the problem of late postal delivery and inferred that
the statute was not the exclusive means of mitigating the section 6213(a)
filing requirement.Y
The Fourth Circuit refused to follow Bloch and Rich, noting that subse-
quent developments in the law had eroded their usefulness.24 One of these
subsequent developments was the Supreme Court's decision in Fallen v.
United States," a decision in which the Fourth Circuit found support for
its position on the continuing vitality of the equitable doctrine of Arkansas
Motor Coaches. In Fallen, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Ap-
peals to accept jurisdiction of a prisoner's criminal appeal where the notice
of appeal was not timely filed due to the prison's unexpeditious handling
of the prisoner's outgoing mail." The presence in the governing statute of
however, indicated actual receipt by the Tax Court seven days after mailing and afteithe
close of the § 6213(a) filing period. Id. The court could not determine the specific reason for
the delay in receipt but concluded that the fault was with either Post Office or IRS employees.
Id. at 191-92.
" See 571 F.2d at 1307-08.
See 198 F.2d at 193.
22 Id. at 192-93.
2 See F.2d at 1308.
Id. In rejecting the Commissioner's argument for the exclusivity of § 7502, the court
stated that it found no indication in § 7502 that it was designed to repudiate the principle
that the government could not deny a taxpayer his day in court by its own negligence. Id.
The court also rejected a second attempt by the IRS to distinguish Arkansas Motor
Coaches. Id. The IRS pointed out that although the taxpayer in Arkansas Motor Coaches had
no alternative but to proceed in the Tax Court, Curry could have paid the deficiency and
sued for a refund in federal district court. The court dismissed this distinction as insubstan-
tial, noting that the Tax Court had rejected such a distinction in an earlier case and pointing
out that a refund suit was not a viable alternative for Curry, who could not pay the $53,000
deficiency. Id.; see Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 548, 566 (Drennan, J., dissenting).
24 See 571 F.2d at 1307 n. 2. The court suggested that the subsequent developments
which eroded the value of Bloch and Rich were the acceptance of jurisdiction by courts on
the basis of equity, as exemplified in Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964), the
relaxation of the strict interpretation of § 7502, and the constitutional rights of prisoners to
access to the courts. Id.
- 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
Id. at 143-44. In Fallen, the prisoner's notice of appeal was governed by the now deleted
Rule 37(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required actual filing in the
Court of Appeals within the stated period. Criminal appeals are now governed by a similar
provision in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
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an admonition to interpret the statute with fairness and sympathy influ-
enced the Supreme Court in its decision.2 The Fourth Circuit acknowl-
edged that the Internal Revenue Code contains no direction to enforce its
rules with fairness and sympathy, but concluded that such a provision was
not necessary for a court to employ standards of fairness in its analysis of
statutes.2 The court considered Fallen analogous to Curry since in both
cases the government had asserted its own negligence as grounds for the
denial of jurisdiction to the claims of faultless prisoners.
2
In an alternative rationale for its decision, the Fourth Circuit stated
that even if section 7502 was the exclusive means of mitigating the ninety-
day requirement for filing, Curry's petition should not be barred. The court
reasoned that, as a remedial statute, section 7502 should be liberally con-
strued. Under such a construction the actions of Curry, who did all he
could to place his petition in the U.S. mail, should be deemed a construc-
tive delivery of the petition prior to the expiration of the ninety-day pe-
riod." In support of this reasoning the court noted that section 7502 has
been interpreted to allow petitions with illegible or missing postmarks."
Accordingly, the dourt concluded that the statute was flexible enough to
include similar situations in which events outside the taxpayer's control
prevented a petition from receiving a timely postmark. 2
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Curry is a questionable intrusion into
the legislative domain." The Tax Court is not an article I but an article
I court,34 and as such only exerts judicial power to the extent provided by
" See 378 U.S. at 142; FED. R. CM. P. 2. Rule 2 requires that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the
elimination of expense and delay.
See 571 F.2d at 1309.
Id. at 1308-09.
31 Id.
31 Id.; see Skolski v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 485 (3rd Cir. 1965) (taxpayer whose petition
for redetermination has an illegible postmark should be granted jurisdiction in Tax Court if
he can show that postmark was timely); Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 548 (1975) (tax-
payer whose petition has no postmark should be granted jurisdiction in Tax Court if he can
show that petition should have received timely postmark).
"' See 571 F.2d at 1309. The Fourth Circuit also suggested a third rationale for its
decision. The court postulated that the constitutional right of a prisoner to access to the
courts might necessitate a decision in favor of Curry. Id. The Court, however, did not develop
this argument, deciding to avoid a constitutional decision since the case could be disposed of
on the basis of its equitable and constructive delivery theories. Id.; see Ashwander v. Tennes-
see Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See 571 F.2d at 1310 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Congress specifically designated the Tax Court an article I court with passage of I.R.C.
§ 7441 in 1969. Article I courts, or legislative courts, are not authorized by any specific
constitutional language, but by the general power of Congress to exercise sovereignty. Note,
Legislative and Constitutional Courts: What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation, 71 YALE L. J. 979,
981 (1962). Article IH courts, or constitutional courts, are those established by Congress under
article I, section 8 of the Constitution. These courts are governed by article I, which contains
the requirements that judges hold their offices during good behavior and without risk of pay
reduction. The distinction between the two types of courts was recognized in American Ins.
Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828), where the Supreme Court recognized Congress'
power to set up courts which did not fulfill the strictures of article in.
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statute." To date Congress has not granted the Tax Court power to accept
jurisdiction in the interests of equity." Therefore, the Tax Court lacks the
power to invoke principles of equity to justify the acceptance of jurisdic-
tion. Since Curry's petition was received by the Tax Court after the statu-
tory period and carried an untimely postmark, the Tax Court was power-
less to accept jurisdiction under either section 6213(a) or section 7502.11
The Fourth Circuit's first rationale, that the Tax Court may accept
jurisdiction of a tardy petition in the interests of equity,3 conflicts with the
exclusively statutory nature of the Tax Court's jurisdiction. Prior to Curry,
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that section 7502 superseded Arkansas
Motor Coaches and had even suggested that the passage of section 7502
was a reaction by Congress to the decision in Arkansas Motor Coaches.3"
Thus, the Curry Court's reliance on that case may be unwarranted. Fur-
thermore, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Fallen is misplaced, as that case
involved an Article III court and a statute which authorized a construction
of sympathy, neither of which was present in Curry." Thus, the Fourth
Circuit has expanded the jurisdiction of the Tax Court without recent case
support or statutory justification.
Even assuming that the Tax Court may expand its jurisdiction on the
basis of equitable considerations,"' Curry was not a proper case in which
1 In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), the Supreme Court examined the
differences between article I and article I courts and stated that the full judicial power is
not deposited in the former. Id. at 449-50. In Lasky v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957),
aff'g per curiam 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the Tax Court had no authority to reopen a final decision in the interests of
equity. The Tax Court had reopened a final decision on the equitable ground of excusable
neglect. When the Tax Court again decided against the taxpayer on the merits in its second
decision, the taxpayer appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit refused to rule on
the merits, concluding that the Tax Court exceeded its powers in reopening the case for a
second decision. 235 F.2d at 100. Cf. Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S.
418 (1943) (Board of Tax Appeals had no authority to reopen proceedings in tax case which
by statute became final thirty days after Supreme Court affirmed findings of Board of Tax
Appeals). But cf., Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1971) (court allowed
judgment of Tax Court to be reopened after time for appeal had expired where IRS as well
as taxpayer urged reopening, although court admitted it was not on firm precedential ground
in reopening).
Article HI courts, on the other hand, may invoke equity to justify acceptance of jurisdic-
tion in proper cases. See Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131
(1937) (district court sitting as bankruptcy court could set aside its decision after time for
appeal had expired); Kelly v. Greer, 334 F.2d 434 (3rd Cir. 1964) (federal district court has
power to vacate its own orders in civil actions whenever such action is appropriate to accom-
plish justice).
u I.R.C. § 7442 grants jurisdiction to the Tax Court only in cases in which a deficiency
has been asserted and in certain declaratory judgment actions. See also I.R.C. §§ 7428,7476,
7477.
1 See Drake v. Commissioner, 554 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1977) (court denied jurisdiction to
petition mailed within statutory period but not postmarked until ninety-first day of the
statutory period).
' See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
' See Bloch v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1958).
' See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 139 (1964).
" See Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1971) (court allowed
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to do so. Courts will generally invoke equity only in favor of a party who
has done all he could to pursue his legal remedy.42 Curry could have done
more than he did to ensure a timely filing. Curry originally could have
requested that his petition be sent by certified mail and obtained a dated
sender's receipt, which is recognized as conclusive evidence of a timely
filing.43 Certainly certification is of minimal inconvenience to a taxpayer
sending out an important document for which time may be of the essence.
Since Curry did not do all he reasonably could have done to protect him-
self, the jurisdictional prerequisites should not have been stretched to
accomodate him.
In addition, the first Curry rationale is not limited in its application to
prisoners. Accepting jurisdiction of Curry's petition will, in the interests
of consistency, require granting jurisdiction to petitions in other analogous
circumstances. The principles of this decision are equally applicable to
citizens who place their petitions in the custody of any government em-
ployee responsible for handling the mail whose subsequent negligence re-
sults in a late postmark being placed on the petition. The expansion of
litigation into these areas is not conducive to the efficient administration
of the tax laws. Such litigation, undesirable in itself, is further complicated
by the scarcity of evidence available to show or dispute a timely mailing
when an untimely postmark is affixed.44
The court's second rationale, which endorsed a liberal construction of
section 7502 so as to provide for a constructive filing by Curry,4 5 is without
direct support in the language of the statute or the case law dealing with
the statute. Section 7502 is clearly limited to those areas where a petition
carries a timely postmark.4 6 There is no statutory language supporting the
concept of a constructive delivery, nor had any court prior to Curry allowed
a taxpayer to obtain jurisdiction with an untimely postmark on the original
cover of the petition. Prior decisions allowing jurisdiction where there was
an illegible47 or missing postmark48 merely allowed the taxpayer to show his
judgment of Tax Court to be reopened after time for appeal had expired where IRS as well
as taxpayer urged reopening, although court admitted it was not on firm precedential ground
in reopening).
1 See Arkansas Motor Coaches v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1952)
(Eighth Circuit directed Tax Court to accept jurisdiction of petition for redetermination filed
late where equities were very strongly on side of petitioner); Bailey v. Williams, 215 Ga. 395,
110 S.E.2d 673 (1959) (court refused to cancel deed in interest of equity noting that equity
will grant no relief to one who through use of normal diligence could have prevented the injury
claimed).
1 Treasury Regulation § 301.7502-1(c)(2) provides, as authorized in I.R.C. § 7502(c)(2),
that the date on the sender's receipt for certified mail is the date of postmark. Treas. Reg. §
301.7502-1(c)(2), T.D. 6444, 1960-1 C.B. 673.
U See Brief for Appellee, Curry v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1978). There
was no evidence supporting Curry's allegation that he had promptly mailed his petition other
than his word. The dependence on such evidence involves a considerable danger of successful
perjury.
15 See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
' See note 5 supra.
47 See Skolski v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 485 (3rd Cir. 1956); Mason v. Commissioner,
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petition had a timely, but illegible postmark or, in the case of a missing
postmark, should have had a timely postmark placed upon it. These cases
did not validate an untimely postmark. Thus, these decisions do not sup-
port the Fourth Circuit's decision to accept jurisdiction of a petition with
a postmark plainly not within the jurisdictional prerequisites.49
Although the Curry decision is consistent with a trend to relax the
requirements for obtaining jurisdiction under section 7502, 50 practical con-
siderations may limit the expansion of the decision beyond the prisoner
context. The most significant potential expansion of Curry would be to
ordinary citizens seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence to show a timely
mailed petition when, for some reason beyond their control, their petition
receives a late postmark." However, the courts' traditional reluctance to
allow jurisdictional litigation to expand into questions of fact which are
often inherently difficult to decide"2 as well as expensive and time consum-
68 T.C. 354 (1977); Alexander Molosh, 45 T.C. 320 (1965); see also Hugh Boyd, 23 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1616 (1964).
11 See Ruegsegger v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 463 (1977); Sylvan v. Commissioner 65 T.C.
548 (1975).
"' The Fourth Circuit's suggested rationale based on the right of a prisoner to access to
the courts is not a strong one. See note 32 supra. The Supreme Court case cited by the Fourth
Circuit on this issue required prisons to provide legal assistance or law libraries to prisoners
in order to ensure that prisoners have access to the courts. See 571 F.2d at 1307 n. 2. See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). This case, as did other Supreme Court cases which
dealt with prisoner's right of access to the courts, involved a continuing practice in the prison
which inhibited prisoners' access to the courts. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) (invalidated a statute excluding law students and legal paraprofessionals from pris-
ons); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g per curiam Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp.
105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (invalidated a statute limiting prison law libraries to a few codes and
references); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (invalidated regulations prohibiting jail-
house lawyers from assisting fellow prisoners). On the other hand, Curry did not show that
Leavenworth Penitentiary, in which he was confined, had been repeatedly depriving prisoners
of access to the Tax Court by its mail handling practices. Furthermore, there was no evidence
that Curry's problem was not merely an unfortunate error which could have also occurred in
a nonprison context.
" The trend to relax the requirements for obtaining Tax Court jurisdiction under § 7502
is best exemplified by the cases dealing with petitions received by the Tax Court without a
postmark. In the earlier cases the Tax Court refused to accept jurisdiction, considering a
timely postmark a sine qua non for jurisdiction. See Rappaport v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 709
(1971), affl'd, 456 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1972); C. Louis Wood, 41 T.C. 593 (1964), affl'd, 338 F.2d
602 (9th Cir. 1964); Nathaniel A. Denman, 35 T.C. 1140 (1961); Luther A. Madison, 28 T.C.
1301 (1957). More recently, however, the Tax Court has reversed itself and agreed to accept
jurisdiction where the taxpayer can show that his petition was mailed early enough so that it
should have received a timely postmark. See Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 548 (1975).
See also Thompson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 737 (1976) (Tax Court accepted jurisdiction of
petition where postmarked cover had been discarded by IRS, where taxpayer could show that
petition was mailed in time to receive timely postmark); Perry Segura & Assoc. v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 406 (1975) (Tax Court accepted jurisdiction of petition where post-
marked cover destroyed in postal handling, where taxpayer could show that petition was
mailed in time to receive timely postmark).
=' See text accompanying note 44 supra.
52 See note 44 supra.
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